

CSC 405 Introduction to Computer Security

Topic 6.2 Multi-Level Databases

MAC in DBMS

- Attribute values and tuples are considered as objects
 - Each attribute A is associated with a classification attribute C (the label)
 - In some models, a tuple classification attribute TC is added to the relation
 - Example:
 - Employee (\underline{SSN} , Name, Salary, Performance) \rightarrow
 - Employee (SSN, C_{SSN} , Name, C_{Name} , Salary, C_{Salary} , Performance, $C_{Performance}$, TC)
 - Such a relation is called a multi-level relation

Employee

| SSN | Cs | Name | C _N | Salary | $C_{\mathbf{s}}$ | Performance | C _P | TC |
|-----------|----|-------|----------------|--------|------------------|-------------|----------------|----|
| 111111111 | U | Smith | U | 40000 | C | Fair | S | S |
| 22222222 | С | Brown | C | 80000 | S | Good | С | S |

Employee (What class C users' see)

| SSN C _s | Name C _N | Salary C _S | Performance | C_{P} | TC |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------|---------|----|
| 111111111 U | Smith U | 40000 C | Null | C | C |
| 22222222 C | Brown C | Null C | Good | C | С |

Employee (What class U users' see)

| SSN C _s | Name C _N | Salary C _S | Performance C _P | TC |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----|
| 111111111 U | Smith U | Null U | Null U | U |

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MAC in DBMS (Cont'd)

- Primary key:
 - The set of attributes that can uniquely identify each tuple.
- Apparent key:
 - The set of attributes that would have formed the primary key in a regular (single-level) relation.

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| U

Polyinstantiation

• Several tuples can have the same apparent key value but have different attribute values for users at different classification levels.

Mission

| <u>ShipID</u> | Cs | Mission | C _M | Target | C_T | TC |
|---------------|----|---------|----------------|--------|-------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | Explore | U | Moon | C | C |
| Enterprise | С | Explore | С | Mars | S | S |

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Is this possible?

Mission

| ShipID | $C_{\mathbf{s}}$ | Mission | C_{M} | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|------------|------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------------------------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | Explore | U | Moon | C | C |
| Enterprise | C | Explore | C | Mars | S | S |

What could be the real key?

What if?

Mission

| <u>ShipID</u> | $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{s}}$ | Mission | C _M | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|---------------|---------------------------|---------|----------------|--------|---------------------------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | explore | С | Mars | S | s |
| Voyager | U | Explore | U | Moon | C | C |
| Enterprise | С | Explore | С | Mars | S | s |

What could be the real key?

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Mission

| <u>ShipID</u> | C_s | Mission | C_{M} | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|---------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|---------------------------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Enterprise | С | Explore | С | Mars | S | S |

Class C user sees

| <u>ShipID</u> | $\mathbf{c_s}$ | Mission | $C_{\mathbf{M}}$ | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|---------------|----------------|---------|------------------|--------|---------------------------|----|
| Voyager | U | Null | C | Null | C | C |
| Enterprise | C | Explore | C | Null | C | C |

Class C user:

UPDATE Mission SET Mission = 'Explore', Target = 'Moon' WHERE ShipID = 'Voyager'

After Update

Mission

| <u>ShipID</u> | $C_{\mathbf{S}}$ | Mission | C_{M} | Target | C_{T} | TC |
|---------------|------------------|---------|---------|--------|---------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| | | | | | | |
| Enterprise | С | Explore | С | Mars | S | s |

What should be returned to a class C user? How about a class S user? What is the general method?

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Mission

| <u>ShipID</u> | $C_{\mathbf{s}}$ | Mission | $C_{\mathbf{M}}$ | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|---------------|------------------|---------|------------------|--------|---------------------------|----|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | Attack | C | Mars | S | s |
| Voyager | U | Explore | U | Moon | C | C |
| Enterprise | C | Explore | C | Mars | S | s |

What to return to Class C user?

Mission

| ShipID | $C_{\mathbf{s}}$ | Mission | C _M | Target | $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{T}}$ | TC |
|------------|------------------|---------|----------------|--------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Voyager | U | Attack | S | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | Attack | С | Mars | S | S |
| Voyager | U | Explore | S | Moon | С (| $\left(\mathbf{s}\right)$ |
| Enterprise | С | Explore | С | Mars | S | s |

What to return to Class C user?

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Integrity Constraints for Multi-level relations

- Entity integrity
 - All attributes that are members of the apparent key must not be null and must have the same security class.
 - All other attribute values in the tuple must have a security class greater than or equal to that of the apparent key
 - <u>Purpose</u>: make the retrieved information meaningful.
- Null integrity
 - If a tuple value at some security level can be derived from a higher-level tuple, then it's sufficient to store the higherlevel tuple.
 - <u>Purpose</u>: Reduce redundancy

Approaches to Multi-level Databases

- Partitioning
- Encryption
- Integrity lock
- Trusted Front-End
- Distributed Databases

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Partitioning

- Separate data in different levels into different partitions.
 - Redundancy
 - Example: the primary key of a logical relation must be duplicated in all partitions in which the relation are stored.
 - Usability
 - Example: a high-level user needs to combine both high-level and low-level data.


Encryption

- Encrypt the sensitive data at each level with a key unique to that level.
 - Known plaintext attack
 - Example:
 - Party attribute is encrypted.
 - Alice knows party="Democrat" for Bob; she can compare the ciphertext of Bob's party attribute with other tuples
 - Reason: Limited set of plaintexts.
 - Authentication
 - Example:
 - Replace one ciphertext with another
 - Above problems can be partially avoided with multiple keys.
 - Unable to use DBMS functionalities for encrypted data.
 - Query optimization, indexes, etc.


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
Integrity Lock

• Provide integrity and limited access for a database.



- Any unauthorized changes to data items can be detected.
- Access to data items is based on the security labels.





Trusted Front End (Cont'd)

- Commutative Filters
 - Processes that interfaces to both the user and the DBMS.
 - Reformat the query by putting in more conditions to filter out unnecessary records.
 - Example:
 - Retrieve NAME where ((Occup= Physicist) ^ (City =WashDC))
 From all records R
 - After reformatting
 - Retrieve NAME where ((Occup= Physicist) ^ (City = WashDC)) From all records R where

```
(Name-level (R) <= User-level) ^
(Occup-level (R) <= User-level) ^
(City-level (R) <= User-level)
```

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Distributed Databases

- Store data items at different level in different physical databases
- Trusted front-end translates each query into single-level queries and send to different databases
- Trusted front-end combines results and returns to the user.

