COVERT CHANNELS

- A covert channel is a communication channel based on the use of system resources not normally intended for communication between the subjects (processes) in the system.
COVERT CHANNELS

• **HARMLESS CASES**
  – The channel parallels an overt channel (and is therefore legal)
  – The sender and receiver are the same process (mumbling channel)

• **HARMFUL CASE**
  – The sender and receiver are not permitted to communicate under the given security policy

![Diagram of covert channels]

- Information is leaked unknown to the high principal
  - High Principal → High Trojan Horse
  - High Trojan Horse → Infected Subject
  - Infected Subject → Low Trojan Horse
  - Low Trojan Horse → Low Principal

**COVERT CHANNEL**
COVERT CHANNELS

- The concern is with subjects not users
  - users are trusted (must be trusted) not to disclose secret information outside of the computer system
  - subjects are not trusted because they may have Trojan Horses embedded in the code they execute
- star-property prevents overt leakage of information and does not address the covert channel problem

COVERT CHANNELS

- Computer systems abound with covert channels
- Covert channels are typically noisy but information theory techniques can be used to achieve error-free communication
COPING WITH COVERT CHANNELS

• identification
  – close the channel or slow it down
  – tolerate it
    • estimate the bandwidth
    • audit occurrence of events involved in usage of the channel

STORAGE VS. TIMING CHANNELS

• STORAGE CHANNELS
  – use system variables and attributes (other than time) to signal information
  – classic example is resource exhaustion channel

• TIMING CHANNELS
  – vary the amount of time required to complete a task to signal information
  – classic example is load sensing channel
RESOURCE EXHAUSTION CHANNEL

- Given 5MB pool of dynamically allocated memory
- HIGH PROCESS
  - bit = 1 \( \rightarrow \) request 5MB of memory
  - bit = 0 \( \rightarrow \) request 0MB of memory
- LOW PROCESS
  - request 5MB of memory
  - if allocated then bit = 0 otherwise bit = 1

LOAD SENSING CHANNEL

- HIGH PROCESS
  - bit = 1 \( \rightarrow \) enter computation intensive loop
  - bit = 0 \( \rightarrow \) go to sleep
- LOW PROCESS
  - perform a task with known computational requirements
  - if completed quickly then bit = 0 otherwise bit = 1
SOME SIMPLE STORAGE CHANNELS

- file names
- file attributes
  - size
  - date modified
  - protection bits
  - access control lists
- file status
  - open or closed
  - locked or unlocked
- file existence

once identified these are relatively easy to close (in principle)

RESOURCE EXHAUSTION CHANNELS

- can be closed by static resource allocation across security classes at the cost of resource utilization
- can be audited to detect attempted usage
TIMING CHANNELS

- timing channels arising due to low level hardware mechanisms can be very fast (Mbits/second)
- the faster the hardware the faster the timing channel
- examples:
  - cache
  - system bus contention
  - paging delays
  - multiprocessor interconnection networks
- practically impossible to audit

DUALITY OF TIMING AND STORAGE CHANNELS

- many storage channels can be converted to timing channels and vice versa
- for example: channels based on sensing disk delays can be formulated as
  - timing channels since it is the delay which is being measured, or
  - storage channels attributed to the system variable which represents the position of the disk arm