Seluge: Secure and DoS-Resistant Code Dissemination in
Wireless Sensor Networks (Version 0.1)
Released on 9/10/08.
Seluge  is an efficient, secure,
robust, and DoS-resistant code dissemination system. It is an
extension to Deluge , an open souce code
dissemination system included in TinyOS distributions. Seluge provides security
protection for code dissemination, including the integrity
protection of code images and resistance to the following three
classes of DoS attacks: (1) DoS attacks against signature packets;
(2) DoS attacks against code dissemination packets; and (3) DoS
attacks against maintenance packets. To the best of our knowledge,
these are all the DoS attacks that manipulate code dissemination
The key contribution of Seluge is a novel way to organize the
packets used to distribute new code images. By carefully arranging
code dissemination data items and their hash images in packets,
Seluge provides immediate authentication of each packet upon
receipt, without disrupting the efficient propagation mechanisms
used by Deluge. Thus, it can defeat the DoS attacks exploiting
Seluge properly authenticates advertisement and SNACK packets.
As a result, it can prevent DoS attacks exploiting the Deluge
epidemic propagation and suppression mechanisms.
Seluge uses a signature to bootstrap the authentication of a new
code image. However, unlike the previous attempts, Seluge uses a
weak authentication along with the signature. This weak
authentication mechanism has nice properties: It can be efficiently
verified by a regular sensor node, but it takes a computationally
powerful attacker a substantial amount of time to forge a weak
authenticator. Moreover, it cannot be pre-computed. Thus, this weak
authentication mechanism provides an effective filter of forged
signatures. As a result, Seluge is not subject to the same DoS
attacks against signature verifications as the previous
For questions please contact An Liu at aliu3 (at)
Scheduled Next Release
- We have developed software for secure remote management of the distributed code images (e.g., reboot and erase). This new extension is named Seluge-ImageMan; it will be included in the next release of Seluge later this fall.
How to Use
- Please check README for details.
We evaluted Seluge in the WiSeNeT testbed deployed on the second floor of Engineering Building II at NC State University. The testbed contained 65 MicaZ motes as Figure 1
shows. The blue star is the source node with new code image. Two
performance metrics are used in our evaluation: Propagation
delay and communication overhead. The propagation
delay is the time required to finish disseminating a code image to
all the nodes in the network. The communication overhead is
measured as the total number of packets transmitted by all the
nodes during a code dissemination. We run the same experiment and
inject code image with 10K, 20K, 30K, and 40K bytes code size for
Deluge, Seluge, Colorado approach , and
Berkeley  scheme and compare their
Figure 1: The testbed (65 MicaZ motes;
152.5 feet × 97 feet).
Both Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that Seluge outperforms all other
secure extensions to Deluge. For the same packet payload size, Seluge has
the smallest propagation delay and communication overhead among all
secure schemes. Deluge has the smallest propagation delay and
communication overhead, because it has no security mechanism in it.
For more details about evaluation, please refer to .
Figure 2: Propagation delay.
Figure 3: Communication overhead.
Copyright and Disclaimer
All new code in this distribution is Copyright 2008
by North Carolina State University. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all
such copies, and that any documentation, announcements, and other
materials related to such distribution and use acknowledge that the
software was developed at North Carolina State University, Raleigh,
NC. No charge may be made for copies, derivations, or distributions
of this material without the express written consent of the
copyright holder. Neither the name of the University nor the name
of the author may be used to endorse or promote products derived
from this material without specific prior written permission.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL,
INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE AND ITS DOCUMENTATION, EVEN IF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
UNIVERSITY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. THE
SOFTWARE PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, AND THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE,
SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, OR MODIFICATIONS."
 Sangwon Hyun, Peng Ning, An Liu,
Wenliang Du, "Seluge:
Secure and DoS-Resistant Code Dissemination in Wireless Sensor
Networks," in Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN
2008), IP Track, pages 445--456, April 2008.
 An Liu, Young-Hyun Oh, Peng Ning,
and DoS-Resistant Code Dissemination in Wireless Sensor Networks
Using Seluge (Demo Abstract)," in Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor
Networks (IPSN 2008), pages 561--562, April 2008.
 J. W. Hui and D. Culler. "The dynamic
behavior of a data dissemination protocol for network programming
at scale," In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference
on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys 2004), November
 J. Deng, R. Han, and S. Mishra.
"Secure code distribution in dynamically programmable wireless
sensor networks," In Proceedings of the Fifth International
Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN
2006), April 2006.
 P. K. Dutta, J.W. Hui, D. C. Chu, and
D. E. Culler. "Securing the deluge network programming system," In
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on
Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN ’06),
This project has been generously supported by
This maerial is based upon work supported by the National
Science Foundation (NSF) under grants CNS-0721424 and
CAREER-0447761, and by US Army Research Office (ARO) under grant
W911NF-05-1-0247. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or
recomendations expressed in this material are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF or